Gray area in intelligence over coup attempt

Could directives be superior to the law?

Answering this question may help resolve a deadlock when the entire debate over intelligence into coup activities focuses on a particular directive.

My previous article was on this directive. The MY 114-1 (C) authorizes the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) to watch suspicious personnel within the barracks, starting from 2011, as it gives the authority to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) and police outside the barracks.

The military wing of the debate says it "cannot watch suspicious personnel outside the barracks."  On the contrary, as we have seen in a response by MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to parliament, the intelligence wing draws attention to the fact that it "cannot gather intelligence within the TSK."

Thus, a big gray area and a field of uncertainty emerges. 

At this point, it would work to have the views of a former senior executive of MİT.

Cevat Öneş, a former senior deputy undersecretary for MİT, pointed out that this directive regulates the "Principles of Protective Security and Cooperation within the TSK" and says that "it is binding only for the TSK." 

This directive is not binding for MİT.

According to Öneş, it is necessary to approach the debate from the point of view of the State Intelligence Services and MİT's law no. 2937. He draws attention to the subclause (a) of the fourth article of the law, which lists the tasks of MİT as: "To establish all security intelligence at the level of state about all current and possible activities from inside or outside, against the unity, existence, independence, security and constitutional order of the country and the nation of the Turkish Republic and all elements that constitutes its national...