Questions on intelligence gathering, sharing and assessment

First question that stands out in the debate on the tipoff to the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) headquarters on the day of the coup attempt on July 15 is whether it was "an  exact warning" of a coup. The second question is a more general one on whether any intelligence had reached government institutions beforehand on a coup attempt by the Gülen movement.

  Both the MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan and Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar reported that Major O.K. did not directly mention a coup; he only informed of an act against MİT. 

However, Akar said they assessed the intelligence as though it was "part of a bigger plot." Other witness statements pointed out that Fidan had also reached the same conclusion. 

Well, what kind of a "bigger plot" can it be to fly helicopters from a military base to kidnap the national intelligence's chief? Since this is not a military drill, it is only logical that a coup d'état comes to minds. 

It is unquestionable that Akar's decision to shut the Turkish air space to military flights and ban the exit of tanks from Ankara's Etimesgut is efforts to prevent a suspected insurrection. In that case, then we should ask a very basic question: Why did Akar regard the measure taken at Etimesgut sufficient? Since he had the possibility of tanks rolling on streets in mind, shouldn't he have thought of this possibility for other cities, primarily for Istanbul? 

Similarly, couldn't have Gen. Akar phoned force commanders and gave a heads up for them to be cautious? The Chief of General Staff, while he was closing the air space for military flights, found it sufficient to inform the Armed Forces Operation Command Center (SKKHM). This order has reached Air Forces Commander Abidin Ünal, who was...