How Hungary Might Avoid the Suspension of EU Funds

Blackmail as policy

This strategy might be labelled as "unethical", but in fact it is simply politics, where blackmail (or, bargaining, if you like) is a commonly accepted method. In fact, the European Commission's track record in financial blackmail is almost as impressive as that of the Hungarian government. Just take the example of the aforementioned recovery funds: all member states' Recovery and Resilience Plans have been approved by the Commission, with two exceptions: Hungary and Poland, the 'illiberal' member states. The Commission justifies the delay in approving the plans with rule-of-law concerns.

However, what the rule of law requires is precisely legality and legal certainty: this means that individuals (or, in this case, member states) are sanctioned only on a clear legal basis, in procedures established by law. The rule-of-law conditionality mechanism has actually been in effect since the beginning of 2021, but the Commission withheld its approval of the recovery plans (and through that, the first recovery fund payments) without even launching that mechanism for almost a year. The procedure was finally launched as late as April this year only against Hungary, but it will take months until a decision is taken about the suspension of funds.

In the background of the delayed activation of the mechanism, there is another example of blackmail. At the end of 2020, the Hungarian and Polish governments gave their consent to the next multiannual financial framework and to the NextGenerationEU recovery package (financed by common debt of the EU) only on condition that the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism would not be activated until the Court of Justice of the European Union, or ECJ, delivers a judgment on whether...